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and dishonest grounds and not worth
the cost, Biggar once again provides
a clearly argued case that the cost
was justified. Whether readers come
away persuaded or not, Biggar’s argument will sharpen their thinking.
Biggar’s is very much a theological
book, and therefore mostly of interest to readers interested in a strong
normative Christian argument. In that
context, whether one is persuaded on
every detail or not, it is a welcome tonic
among the often shallow and sloppy
thinking about war and the international
system from some Christian circles.
Yet there is value in the book even for
readers who may not share the full
theological view. It certainly brings a
historical depth to the discussion that
much contemporary philosophical just
war thinking does not, detached as it is
from the long historical tradition in the
West Biggar represents, and attempting
to grapple with the ethical problem of
war with a comparatively small tool kit.
MARTIN L. COOK

Pattee, Phillip G. At War in Distant Waters: British Colonial Defense in the Great War. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2013. 274pp. $59.95

Phillip Pattee, a retired naval officer and
professor at the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, examines
British efforts before the First World
War to craft a global maritime strategy
to deal with threats that were expected
to arise during a war with Germany. In
doing so, he makes a compelling case
that British naval thinkers were not
completely fixated on the German High
Seas Fleet, nor were they unconscious
of the critical need to keep the sea-lanes
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of commerce and communication open
for their merchant navy and England’s
national economy. Threats included
the inevitability of impossibly high
insurance rates during times of war,
the combat capability of the overseas
German East Asia squadron, and the
possibility of persistent predations by
German raiders. British leaders also
understood that, despite the size of
the Royal Navy, British assets would
initially be stretched thin, as most
British capital ships would be kept in
home waters to respond to potential
action by their German counterparts.
Pattee discusses British efforts to overcome these threats. His review of British
involvement in insurance programs designed to keep merchant vessels in trade
is fascinating and illuminates what must
be one of the least known programs of
the First World War. Strategies to deal
with the German East Asia squadron,
raiders, and shore-based supporting
communication systems are better
known, but Pattee still does them justice.
Taken all together, At War in Distant
Waters is a useful addition to a complete account of the First World War.
However, this book could have been
much more. For starters, the title is misleading. Although the book chronicles
actions taken in colonial waters, the
depicted purpose is much more aimed
at defending Britain, not its colonies.
Nor does Pattee convincingly prove
that Great Britain conquered German
colonies to provide maritime security. Although some actions, such as
the seizing or destruction of German
high-frequency radio installations, were
designed for this purpose, others, such
as the conquest of German Southwest
Africa, were not. Britain could have
easily conducted limited operations and
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denied naval basing and support from
the German colonies. A major second
African front, although sensible for
other reasons, was not needed to protect
seaborne trade. Additionally, the book
is surprisingly dry, when it definitely
did not need to be so. The eradication of
German raiders from the world’s oceans
is a remarkable story, complete with
drama, excitement, and extraordinary
personalities. Spee’s one-sided German
victory at Coronel and his subsequent
defeat at the Falklands were two of the
major naval battles of the war, yet are
given short shrift by Pattee. The tale of
Count Felix von Luckner and his raider
Seeadler, although occurring after the
raider threat was greatly diminished,
would provide a compelling illustration
of the challenges in hunting down a
gifted and tenacious raider captain.
Pattee does relate the story of SMS
Königsberg, but in such a brief manner as not to do justice to the very real
concerns the cruiser created for the
Admiralty, or the sheer magnitude of
effort it took to destroy the warship. To
compound matters, Pattee claims the
destruction of Königsberg was carried
out by two mortar-equipped barges.
This is an error. To put Königsberg out of
commission, the Admiralty dispatched
the monitors HMS Mersey and HMS
Severn on a long and hazardous journey
to the Rufiji delta, where Königsberg
was hiding, to sink it. For a book of
this nature, this error is surprising.
While Pattee does include a description
and evaluation of British operations in
Mesopotamia—and ties these actions to
the strategic importance of oil—the book
is strangely silent on the Dardanelles
campaign and the U-boat war. Perhaps
this is because Pattee does not see the
Mediterranean or Atlantic as “colonial”
waters, or because neither Gallipoli

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/15

Summer2015Review.indb 158

nor submarines figured sufficiently in
prewar planning. Still, each of these
challenges either demanded or resulted
from evolving British strategies and
both would seem worthy of inclusion.
Still, when all is said and done, Pattee
has contributed to a deeper understanding of British—and German—maritime
strategy in the First World War. By
shifting focus away from the North Sea
and the clashes between the Grand and
High Seas Fleets, he has reminded the
reader that British maritime leaders
understood global vulnerabilities and
planned to deal with them long before the guns of August opened fire.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Appelbaum, Peter C. Loyal Sons: Jews in the German Army in the Great War. London: Vallentine
Mitchell, 2014. 347pp. $79.95

Centennial commemoration and observance of the First World War have generated many books studying major and
minor aspects of what was hoped would
be the “war to end all wars,” or as H. G.
Wells titled a 1914 book, The War That
Will End War. It wasn’t; instead, it was
the first act of a century-long tragedy.
The present volume provides a significant study of the more than 100,000
German-Jewish and 320,000 AustroHungarian Jewish soldiers serving
during the war. One in eight was killed.
First World War historian Jay Winter is
correct when he writes in the volume’s
foreword, “we owe a debt to Peter Appelbaum for bringing to light the Jewish element in this tragic story.” The volume is
groundbreaking in its scope and depth.
The volume consists of eight chapters
and four appendixes. The first chapter
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